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PART III
HARD ROCK MINING ON THE PUBLIC LANDS; THE LOCATION SYSTEM
The purpose of the Mining Laws of 1872 was to encourage 
mineral development in order to settle the West and establish 
the industrial base of the East.
A. After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and before the 
Civil War, explorers, trappers and miners roamed freely 
over the^ unsettled public domain. Where surface deposits 
of precious metals were found, miners took as many 
nuggets as they could carry.
1. They were trespassers on land owned by the United 
States for the benefit of the nation because;they 
were there without governmental authority taking 
property of the nation.
2. Nevertheless, the miners were more concerned about 
hostile Indians and claim-jumping rivals than of 
prosecution by the U.S. government.
3. With news of the discovery of gold in California 
at Sutter's Mill in 1848, the gold rush of 1849 
was on. Thousands of adventurers from the East 
and all over the world flooded into California.
4. Congress debated adoption of a federal mining law, 
starting in 1848, but could not agree whether to 
license small mineral tracts, reserving a royalty, 
to sell small tracts outright for cash, or to 
grant rights of free use in order to encourage 
mineral development.
B. In order to establish order and to protect their diggings, 
the miners organized mining districts and adopted 
regulations to govern mining claims.
1. The mining district regulations governed require­
ments for making claim to minerals, notice, the 
size and markings of claims, the amount of work 
required to hold possession, and extralateral 
rights. Sometimes the mining districts conducted 
civil and criminal trials.
2. The mining district regulations were based on 
concepts of equity, the rule of priority, and the  
practical needs of miners.
c. With the Civil War causing a desperate need for revenue, Congress finally passed a federal mining law in 1866, 
granting miners rights of free access to minerals on 
the public lands.
1. The federal mining law was not intended to produce 
revenue directly, but through its economic spinoff, 
to enhance the value of federal land and to promote 
industrial production in the East.
2. The federal mining law adopted the location system 
established by the mining districts. The first 
mining law was the Lode Law of 1866 confirming the 
right to locate claims on lodes. Lodes or veins 
are mineral-bearing rock in place between country 
rock with reasonably distinct boundaries on either 
side.
3. Since the Lode Law of 1866 did not authorize the 
patenting of placer claims, Congress passed the 
Placer Act of 1870 to extend the location system 
to placers. Placers are any mineral deposits 
which are not lodes or veins of mineral in place 
between reasonably distinct boundaries on either 
side.
4. Finally, Congress codified and expanded the Lode 
Law of 1866 and the Placer Act of 1870 into the 
Mining Law of 1872.
5. The^ 1872 Mining Law, embellished by a host of 
judicial opinions, statutory exceptions, administra­
tive regulations and decisions, and supplemented 
by state law, is the present location system.
(a) The location system is the chief means today 
for acquiring mining rights in the public lands.
(b) The leasing system established by the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920 is the major alternative.
It provides an entirely different method for 
acquiring what can be called the fuel and 
fertilizer minerals. These leaseable minerals 
are oil, gas, coal, potassium, sodium, phosphate, 
oil shale, native asphalt, solid and semisolid 
bitumen and bituminius rock, including oil 
impregnated rock or sands, and sulphur in 
Louisiana and New Mexico.
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(c) A third system is provided by the Materials 
Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-604. The
Materials Act provides that nonmetallic 
minerals of widespread occurence, such as 
sand and gravel, peat moss, and others, are 
to be sold or granted under free-use permits.
6. The essence of the location system is the right of 
self-initiation. Unless mineral entry has been 
restricted, the prospector may enter the public 
domain at will, where he chooses, to search for 
minerals.
(a) Simply put, the mining law provides that the 
first locator who discovers a valuable mineral 
deposit and diligently pursues the find is 
protected against rivals, and is entitled to 
remove all minerals discovered even though 
the locator does not elect to purchase title 
in fee simple from the United States.
(b) It is the myriad refinements of these basic 
principals which constitute the mineral
  location system.
I. All valuable minerals are subject to location except those 
which have been specifically removed from the location 
system by Congress.
A. The Mining Law of 1872 expressly allows the location of 
mining claims upon "veins or lodes of quartz or other 
rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar [mercury], 
lead, tin, copper or other valuable deposits." 30 U.S.C.A. 
§ 23.
1. Note that the act expressly names only certain 
metals as locatable. However, diamonds were held 
locatable in 1872 as "valuable mineral deposits."
14 Atty. Gen. 115 (1872). After that, it was 
settled that nonmetalliferous minerals were locat­
able along with metalliferous minerals.
2. The Commissioner of the General Land Office held 
in 1872 that whatever is recognized as a mineral 
by the standard authorities is a valuable mineral 
deposit under the 1872 Act. Copp, Mineral Lands 
50 (2d ed. 1882 ).
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3 . Chemical composition and crystalline structure are the principal distinguishing characteristics of 
minerals. While sand and gravel do not have 
definite chemical composition and crystalline 
structure, still, they are locatable if they are 
uncommon varieties.
4. Proof of mineral character, even for sand and 
gravel, is established if it is treated as a 
mineral in trade or commerce or has special or 
peculiar value in trade, commerce, manufacture, 
science or the arts. Stanislaus Electric Power 
Co., 41 L.D. 655 (1912) .
5. Stone useful as building material and salt deposits 
were held to be valuable mineral deposits and thus 
locatable. Congress adopted these interpretations 
by the Building Stone Act of 1892, 30 U.S.C. § 161 
and the Saline Placer Act of 1901, 29 Stat. 526 
[repealed by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920] .
6. Ordinary deposits of clay and limestone were never 
held locatable even though they could be marketed 
at a profit. Holman v. Utah, 41 L.D. 314 (1912). 
Other decisions established that such minerals as 
decomposed rhyolite, blow sand, peat moss, and 
sand and gravel suitable only as fill material or 
other ordinary uses were not locatable. In fact, 
the Materials Act of 1947 was enacted to allow the 
disposal of such minerals and vegetative materials, 
including yucca and timber, by sale or free use 
permit to local municipalities. The Common Varieties 
Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. § 611, amended the Materials 
Act of 1947 to legislatively prohibit any further 
location of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, 
cinders, clay and other nonmetallic minerals of 
widespread occurrence, leaving them disposable 
only under the 1947 Act. The Common Varieties Act 
means that building stone must be an uncommon 
variety to remain locatable under the Building Stone Act.
7. Other mineral substances expressly held to be 
excluded from location before the Mineral Leasing 
Act of 1920 were fossils, meteorites, and crystal­
line deposits in caverns. The Act of September 28, 
1962, 76 Stat. 652, removed petrified wood from 
the class of locatable minerals.
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8. Petroleum was originally subject to the mining law
and locatable through mining claims. Union Oil 
Co., 25 L.D. 351 (1897). The Oil Placer Act of 
1897, 29 Stat. 525, confirmed this decision,
making both oil and gas locatable. Oil shale was 
thus originally locatable under both the Oil 
Placer Act and the mining law.
9. Coal was considered a valuable mineral from the
first, but it was never subject to mineral location. 
Instead, coal was sold at public auction and later 
leased. Coal Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 343; Coal Act 
of 1873, 17 Stat. 607; Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq., Federal Coal Leasing 
Amendments Act of 1975, 43 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.
10. Some mineral substances now subject to location 
were not known or considered valuable for many 
years after the mining laws were enacted. Other 
unknown or unrecognized minerals may yet become 
valuable mineral deposits and thus become subject 
to location.
11. Water was held not locatable in 1978 on the basis 
that the substance located must not only be a 
valuable mineral within the ordinary meaning but 
must also be the type of valuable mineral that the  
1872 Congress intended to make the basis of a 
mining claim. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products 
Co., 436 U.S. 604 (1978).
12. 43 C.F.R. § 3812.1 summarizes the situation: 
"Whatever is recognized as a mineral by the standard 
authorities, whether metállic or other substance, 
when found in quantity and quality sufficient to 
render the lands valuable on account thereof, is 
treated as coming within the purview of the Mining 
laws." ". . . A  'mineral' is a substance that (1) 
is recognized as mineral, according to its chemical 
composition, by the'‘'standard authorities on the 
subject;" or (2) is classified as mineral product 
in trade or commerce; or (3) possesses economic 
value for use in trade, manufacture, the sciences, 
or in the mechanical or ornamental arts." 43
C.F.R. § 2710.0-5e.
III. The United States reserved minerals from many agricultural 
homesteads in the West, and -those minerals are subject to 
'location of mining claims and^ieases by the United States.
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A. During the disposal of the public domain from 1800 to 
1900, much mineral wealth of the country passed into 
private lands, free of charge.
1. The lands sold, and those granted under the preemp­
tion and homestead acts, as well as the state and 
railroad grants, were not to include mineral 
lands, but only agricultural lands. The settlement 
acts excluded known mineral lands.
2. Conversely, the mining laws were the only legisla­
tive authority for acquiring mineral lands.
3. Unfortunately, there were no adequate scientific 
means of classifying land as agricultural or 
mineral, so the settlement acts were applied to 
all lands from the Atlantic in the East to the 
Rocky Mountains in the West.
B. Around 1900, the conservationists objected to further 
patenting of mineral lands under agricultural laws, 
especially to lands where coal deposits were visible 
along the surface and lands where oil seeped to the 
surface of water bodies. This prompted President 
Roosevelt to withdraw much of the public domain from 
further settlement for a better identification of coal 
and oil lands and for a better method of preventing 
their agricultural settlement.
1. Roosevelt first withdrew suspected coal lands from 
operation of the settlement acts. To reopen the 
westward flow of people and trade, Congress adopted 
the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 81, 85. These acts allowed agricultural entries 
and disposals, but reserved the coal to the U.S. 
for later disposition.
2. By 1909, to save oil lands, Roosevelt and Taft had 
withdrawn most of the remaining public domain from 
all forms of entry. Congress stewed but passed 
the Pickett Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 847 [repealed], 
opening the lands to location of claims for metal­
liferous minerals, but leaving them closed to oil 
entries and agricultural entries.
3. Congress then passed the Agricultural Entry Act of 
1914, 39 U.S.C. § 121, to reopen the public domain 
to agricultural entries. The 1914 Act reserved 
deposits of phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas
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or asphaltic minerals to the U.S. Sodium and 
sulphur were added to the list of reservations in 1933.
4. In the arid West, large stock raising ranches were 
necessary; 160-acre farms could not succeed on the 
dry or_mountainous lands. So, Congress enlarged 
the original 160-acre homestead to 640 acres by 
the Stockraising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C.
§ 291 [repealed]. It authorized settlement on 
lands chiefly valuable for grazing and crops. It 
reserved all minerals to the U.S.
5. The oil lands remained open only to metalliferous 
mineral entry after the Pickett Act of 1910, 36 
Stat. 874 [repealed].' The 1914 Agricultural Entry 
Act opened these lands only to agricultural entries 
while Congress argued. Finally, the deadlock was 
broken in favor of leasing oil, and the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920 was enacted. By it, an entirely
. different system for disposal of oil, gas and 
fertilizer minerals was established.
(a) The leasing system applies to the leasing 
minerals which were federally reserved and to 
leasing minerals on the public lands.
(b) The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 therefore had 
the effect of legislatively withdrawing from 
mineral location all oil, gas and fertilizer 
lands of the U.S. and subjecting them to 
leasing.
(c) The Mineral Leasing Act provided for the sole 
means of acquiring coal reserved under the 
Coal Lands Act of 1909 and 1910 and of acquir­
ing the fuel and fertilizer minerals reserved 
under the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914, and 
leaseable minerals reserved under the Stock- 
raising Homestead Act of 1916.
(d) The only federally reserved minerals which 
are locatable are the non-leasing minerals 
under stockraising homesteads. The Stockrais­
ing Homestead Act gives prospectors the right 
to enter to prospect for locatable minerals . 
and to locate mining claims. Thereafter, to 
reenter, the location must have the landowner’s 
consent, or agree to pay damages, or file a 
bond with the BLM to assure such payment.
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6. Altogether, some 63,000,000 acres were patented into private ownership subject to reservations of 
some minerals, or all minerals, to the U.S. Most 
of these reservations were made under the Stock- 
raising Homestead Act which reserved all minerals 
to the U.S. for the benefit of the public'. BLM, 
Public Land Statistics (1977). These severed 
estates have proved to be troublesome; the ranchers 
who knew the limited estate they were homesteading 
now want to deny that the U.S. has the right to 
allow mineral development under their land even if 
the surface is restored. To gain their cooperation 
so mining claims can be located, most mineral 
operators give ranchers a royalty on the minerals 
which the ranchers clearly do not own. Likewise, 
the U.S. has legislated that consent of the rancher 
must be obtained before the public coal owned by 
the U.S. underlying private surf ace <Tands can be 
leased. Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act 
of 1977, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328, § 1304. The
price of such consent is usually payment. The 
provisions of § 1272 of'SMCRA precluding private 
owners or lessees of coal from extracting them 
without surface owner consent have been held 
unconstitutional as a taking of property without 
the compensation required by the 5th Amendment. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n v. 
Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980), ruling 
stayed pending action on appeal, 100 Sup. Ct. 
1306.
C. By 1934, many families of stockraising homesteaders had 
gone broke on 640-acre ranches. The range cattle 
industry, which had grown up on the open range where 
free grazing was allowed, had suffered the loss of 
those free grazing lands to homesteaders, and overgraz­
ing and soil erosion became serious problems. For 
these reasons, both sides, namely the western cattlemen 
and the eastern conservationists sought an end to homesteading.
1. The result was the Taylor Grazing Act which estab­
lished grazing districts of the remaining public 
domain to regulate and restore those grazing 
lands. The Taylor Act also precluded, further 
settlement entries unless the land was thereafter 





2 . Since the administration quickly withdrew all the 
remaining public domain, except Alaska, from 
settlement entries, the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 
had the practical effect of repealing the home­
stead acts. FLPMA formally repealed the homestead 
acts in 1976 and dictated an end to Alaska home­
steading as of 1986.
3. Sections 5 and 6 of the Taylor Grazing Act are 
still in effect. They still provide that the 
rights of the miner under applicable laws to 
enter, prospect, locate, develop, mine, lease, or 
patent mineral deposits on the public domain 
within grazing districts are not to be restricted, 
even_Jthough-~the___lands are leased, for ̂ grazing. 43
U.S.C. §§ 315d, 315e. ' ..../
4. The Taylor Act allowed exchanges of public land 
for private to block up grazing districts and 
authorized the sale of isolated, disconnected and 
small tracts up to 160 acres. Exchanges and such 
sales are now made only under authority of FLPMA. 
In the Taylor Act conveyances, the Taylor Act
' required the reservation of all minerals to the
U.S. Landowners who acquired surface estates under
_the_Taylor._Act hold' their land subject to the
Superior right of...lessees from the U.S.to remove 
the mineraLs_. Carlin v. Cassriel, 50 L.D. 383 
£1924); Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1978).
The location system applies to all valuable mineral deposits
in the unreserved and unappropriated public domain.
IA. 30 U.S.C. § 22, Mining Law of 1872: ’'Except as other­
wise provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands 
belonging to the United States, both surveyed and 
unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and 
purchase, and the lands in which they are found to 
occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United 
States and those who have declared their intention to 
become such, under regulations prescribed by law, and 
according to the local customs or rules of miners in 
the several mining districts, so far as the same are 
applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the 
United States.1
B. 30 states were created out of the original public 
domain, so the mining law applied to these public land 
states at one time or another.
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1. There are unreserved and unappropriated public lands left in only 19 states. These are Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South 
Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
2. The mining law for federal lands has little prac­
tical effect in the midwestern and eastern states.
3. The mining laws have the most importance in the 11 
westernmost continental states, North and South 
Dakota, and Alaska. There the laws apply to _ the 
unreserved and unappropriated public domain, 
including federally reserved minerals under pri­
vate lands subject to the Stockraising Homestead 
Act and the Taylor Grazing Act. The Dept, of 
Interior has never issued regulations making other 
federally reserved minerals subject to either 
location or leasing. Acquired lands, those pur­
chased or acquired by the U.S. from a state or 
private party by purchase, gift, exchange or 
condemnation, are not subject to location.
V. During the settlement era of the public domain, from about 
1800 to 1934, Congress was not prepared to adopt specific 
legislation on a regular basis to reserve specific lands of 
special value from operation of the general settlement laws.
A. While Congress did reserve special tracts, such as
Yellowstone National Park in 1872, the great bulk of
withdrawals have been made by the executive.
1. From the first, the presidents withdrew lands from 
entry_ to reserve them for Indian reservations, 
wildlife refuges, and other special uses. The 
president asserted an implied authority of the 
executive, as manager of the national assets and 
government, to withdraw, even though the Constitu­
tion specifically places all power to dispose of 
and regulate the public lands in the Congress. 
Art. IV, Section 3, Clause 2.
2. To control the large scale withdrawals of oil 
lands after 1900, Congress adopted the Pickett Act 
of 1920, 36 Stat. 841 [repealed by FLPMA of 1976]. 
The Pickett^ Act authorized the president to make 
temporary withdrawals from settlement and location 
for nonmetalliferous minerals, and to set aside
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3.
water power sites or lands to be classified for 
their best use. The Pickett Act expressly re­
quired such reservations to be left open for 
metalliferous mineral entry and location.
Even after the Pickett Act, the presidents con­
tinued to make reservations, frequently doing so 
under the implied authority because those with­
drawals were permanent, at least until ordered 
otherwise by an executive. The Supreme Court held 
the presidents could make withdrawals under the 
implied authority since Congress had acquired and 
had not legislated otherwise. U.S. v. Midwest Oil 
Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1914).
B. Finally, by Sections 704 and 204 of FLPMA of 1976, 43 
U.S.C. §§ 704, 204, Congress reasserted its authority 
over reservations and mandated they could be made 
thereafter only under authority of FLPMA.
1. After FLPMA, the executive can only withdraw 
tracts of more than 5,000 acres for periods up to 
20 years and only after reporting to Congress the
' effect, including alternative sites, and the
geologic potential of the lands withdrawn. Cong­
ress retains the right to revoke such withdrawals.
2. Tracts of less than 5,000 acres can only be with­
drawn by the executive for specific uses of known 
resources.
3. Nevertheless, the BLM is refusing to issue mineral 
leases on some Overthrust Belt areas, especially 
in wilderness study areas, without reporting 
withdrawals to Congress. The practice is being 
challenged in two cases in the District of Wyoming 
federal court.
C. No one, not even the BLM, knows how many acres of 
public lands were withdrawn from mineral entry before 
FLPMA, or even has a master list of those withdrawn. 
Under FLPMA, each state BLM office is compiling this 
data from the individual orders issued willy-nilly over 
the years. The total acreage withdrawn is thought to 
be some 70% to 80% of the remaining public domain. In 
addition to withdrawals for Indian reservations, na­
tional forests, national parks, national wildlife 
refuges, national trails, national wild and scenic 
rivers, wilderness and primitive areas, national his-
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toric sites, national monuments, national cemeteries, 
and such better known withdrawals, there are reserva­
tions for Naval Oil Reserves Nos. 1 through 4, military 
reservations, powersite and reclamation withdrawals, 
public stockraising water holes and stock driveways, 
oil shale withdrawals and many other withdrawals for 
specific uses.
1. FLPMA ratified the bulk of the past withdrawals by 
confirming the set-asides made for Indian reserva­
tions, national forests, national parks, national 
wildlife refuges, and national trails.
2. FLPMA gives Interior until 1991 to prepare a 
review of all other withdrawals in the West, 
including mineral withdrawals on BLM and national 
forest lands. The report is to go to Congress, 
with recommendations, for its action.
D. Despite FLPMA, which barred executive reservations 
except throught its procedures, President Carter with­
drew 56 million acres in Alaska in 1978, citing the 
Antiquities Act of 1906 as authority. At the same 
time, Secretary of the Interior Andrus withdrew over 
100,000 millionj acres in Alaska under his authority 
granted by FLPMA to make emergency withdrawals for up 
to' 3 years. These withdrawals were intended to force 
Congress to adopt an Alaskan Lands Bill to set aside 
much of Alaska, but so far, no such legislation has 
been passed out of Congress.
E. Notwithstanding^ the overhaul of withdrawal procedures 
made by FLPMA in 1976, a mineral entryman still must 
determine the authority under which specific reserva­
tions or withdrawals were made. Do that by examining 
the master title (MT) plat and the historical index of 
public land transactions in the state BLM office. Only 
after_ such _ a land status check will you know if the 
land is available for location of mining claims.
1. The MT plat visually portrays lands patented with 
mineral reservations to the U.S., state land 
grants, state selection lists, acquired lands, 
patented mining claims, all types of withdrawals, 
and unreserved public domain lands.
2. The use plat shows temporary uses such as mineral 
leases and special use permits.
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3. Segregation of the withdrawals from mineral entry 
used to occur when Interior approved an applica­
tion for withdrawal. After FLPMA, segregation 
occurs when notice of the proposed withdrawal, is 
published in the Federal Register.
VI. There are several types of mining locations, and the locator 
must choose the right type for the purpose or the location 
will be a nullity.
A. Mineral deposits may be located either as lode claims 
or placer claims. The 1872 mining laws allows location 
of a "vein or lode of quarts or other rock in place" 
bearing valuable minerals. 30 U.S.C. § 23. Placers 
are all other forms of deposit. 30 U.S.C. §35. In 
many modern cases, the choice is difficult since many 
low grade deposits now mined are disseminated deposits 
which do not fall clearly into one or the other 
category.
1. A lode is a zone or belt of mineralized rock in 
place, whether loose and friable or very hard, 
with reasonable trend and continuity, separated 
from neighboring nonmineralized rock (country 
rock) by reasonably distinct boundaries on either 
side. See McMullin v. Magnuson, 102 Colo. 230, 78 
P .2d 964 (1938).
2. Placers are all other forms of deposit, including 
the traditional superficial deposits of precious 
metals washed down from a vein or lode into the 
bed of an ancient river or settled among the 
alluvium in beds of active streams, as well as 
deposits fixed between rock in place but which 
lack reasonable trend and continuity, and reason­
able segregation from the neighboring country 
rock. Titanium Actynite Industries v. McLennon, 
272 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1959).
3. Uranium in beds of sandstone is epigenetic, that 
is, carried into the formation by some solution 
after the host rock was formed. Still, it is 
locatable as a lode because it meets the require­
ments defined for a lode. Globe Mining Co. v. 
Anderson, 318 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 1957).
4. To err between locating as lodes or placers is 
fatal for a lode deposit will not sustain a placer 
location and vice versa. Bowen v. Chemi-Cote, 432
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P .2d 435, (Ariz. 1967); Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 
206 (1920).
(a) The definitions emphasize the present form of 
the deposit more than its origin. The science 
of geology does not matter since the mining 
law was written for the practical miner, not 
the trained geologist.
(b) If a deposit is bounded on either side by 
rock in place, it is likely to be considered 
a lode. If the ore is on top of the ground 
and has no cover except a thin veneer of 
soil, it is likely to be a placer.
(c) In the case of a dispute, the courts tend to 
find in favor of the first locator.
B. Lodes in placers fit into the same definitions; the 
only difference is that the law gives lodes in placers 
special treatment so that placer claimants are con­
strained to identify and pay for lodes within the 
placer upon patenting. Otherwise, they would obtain 
title to both deposits by paying only for the placer 
deposit.
1. If there is a known lode within a placer claim, at 
the time of an application to patent to placer, 
the lode must be listed and paid for separately. 
30 U.S.C. § 37. If not, the placer patentee is 
not entitled to possess it. Clipper Mining Co. v. 
Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220 (1904).
2. If a placer patent issues before a lode deposit is 
known to exist, the placer patentee gets it with­
out additional payment.
C. The mining law of 1872 provides for tunnel sites where 
a horizontal excavation, called an adit, is dug in 
search of lodes or veins not appearing at the surface. 
30 U.S.C. § 27. The tunnel site owner is entitled to 
possession of any previously unknown lodes discovered 
in the excavation for a distance of up to 3,000 feet along the excavation.
1. A monument must be placed at the portal of the 
adit, naming the locator and stating the proposed 
direction of the excavation, its height and width, 
and the course and distance from the portal to a
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permanent object in the vicinity. The center line 
of the tunnel site must be staked on the surface 
to establish the surface area which is preempted 
from location by a junior locator.
2. The tunnel site locator is protected for a dis­
tance of 3,000 feet into the excavation, as to 
1,500 feet in any direction of any blind lodes cut 
by the excavation which were not previously known. 
The tunnel site locator has priority even if the 
lode is located on the surface before it is inter­
sected in the adit. Enterprise Mining Co. v. 
Rico-Aspen Consol. Mining Co., 157 U.S. 108 
(1897).
3. The tunnel site, as such, conveys no surface 
rights, and the locator who discovers a lode in 
the excavation must make a lode location of the 
lode on the surface.
4. Discontinuing work for over 5 months constitutes 
abandonment of the tunnel.
5. Tunnel sites are uncommon today. Most exploration 
for ores in mountains, or on flatlands, and whether 
at deep or shallow depths, is done with drilling 
rigs.
D. Mill sites of up to 5 acres may be located on nonmineral 
land to provide space for working claims or reducing 
ores. 42 C.F.R. § 3864.1-1. The mill. site maybe used 
either in association with a specific lode or placer 
claim or independently, as a custom mill site. 30 
U.S.C. § 42.
1. Rights to a mill site attached and the mineral 
character is determined as of the time of location, 
if construction is diligently pursued, and subse­
quently improved mineral economics do not deprive 
the owner bf his rights. Cleary v. Skiffich, 28 
Colo. 362, 65 P.59 (1901).
2. It is difficult in some mining districts to find 
usable land which is sufficiently norunineral, and 
it can be difficult and costly to prove the non­
mineral character to the BLM.
3. Mill sites are not mining claims; they are usually 
considered mining locations, but they may be 
patented under the mining laws.
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4. The right to exclusive possession of unpatented mill sites depends upon actual use and occupancy 
for a proper purpose; that is, for mining or 
milling purposes. An anticipated future use is 
not sufficient. E.g., U.S. v. S.M.P. Mining Co., 
67 I.D. 144 (1960). See 1 American Law of Mining, 
§ 5.34.
VII. Procedures for locating claims are well settled, but it is 
often difficult in the field to follow the requirements 
carefully.
A. The Mining Law of 1872 allows the location of a mining 
claim by distinctly marking the location on the ground 
so that the boundaries can be readily traced, and 
making a record of the name or names of the locators, 
date of location, and a description of the claim by 
reference to some natural object or permanent monument 
which will identify the claim. 30 U.S.C. § 28.
1. State law or mining district regulations (no 
longer maintained) are authorized to supplement 
these federal requirements by detailing the loca­
tion, manner of recording, amount of annual assess­
ment work or improvements (not less than $100) 
necessary to hold possession of a claim.
2. Only in Alaska does the federal mining law require 
that location notices and annual assessment affi­
davits be recorded in the local records. 30 
U.S.C. §§ 49a-44f.
3. State law > in the western states requires the
 monumentation of claims (staking) by cornerposts, 
and, in some cases, side and end centerposts.
4. State law in the western states requires posting 
of a copy of the location notice on the claim at 
the point of discovery and recording it with the 
local county recorder.
B. For the first time, FLPMA of 1976 requires that claim 
location notices also be filed with the BLM state office.
1. If state law, such as those of the Midwest and 
South, do not provide for recording, the FLPMA 
regs require recording directly with the state BLM 
office. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.1-2(a).
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2. Location certificates must be filed with the BLM 
for both mining claims and tunnel and mill sites 
as well.
3. The location certificate to be filed is an exact 
duplicate of that filed or transmitted for filing 
with the local county. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.0-5(i). 
If not appearing on that "official record", the 
BLM copy must contain other data, specifically the 
name or number of the claim, or both; the book and 
page of the local recording of the certificate of 
location, and amendments; the name and current 
mailing address of the owner, or owners, if known; 
the type of claim or site; the date of location; a 
legal description by township, range, section and 
quarter section; and, a map showing the location 
by reference to a quarter section. The filing fee 
is $5.00 per claim or site.
(a) U.S. topographic maps are frequently used.
(b) Contiguous claims or sites and groups of them 
in the same general area may be depicted on 
one map if each individual claim or site is 
identified. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.1-2.
(c) Failure to file with the state BLM office
within 90 days from location means the claim 
is null and void, and that the land reverts 
to the public domain, Solicitor’s Opinion, 
GFS (MIN) S0-1 (1978). The land may be
withdrawn in the interim or relocated by a 
rival locator, and at the least, the original 
claimant would have the expense of relocating 
it.
4. Transfers of nonpatented mining claims and tunnel 
and mill sites must be filed with the state BML 
office within 60 days of the transfer. Failure to 
file transfers does not invalidate the claim, but 
the transferee will not be given notice of any 
government contest of the location. 43 C.F.R.
§ 3833.3.
5. Location certificates for pre-FLMPA unpatented 
mining claims and sites, those located on or 
before October 21, 1976, had to be filed with the 
BLM state office within the 3 years following the 
Act, specifically, on or before October 21, 1979.
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43 U.S.C. § 1744. The BLM extended the deadline 
to Monday, October 22, 1979.
(a) There was a great land rush after October of 
1979 to relocate claims which were deemed 
abandoned for failure to meet the filing 
deadline.
(b) The BLM expected that approximately 6 million 
claims would be registered, throughout the 11 
Western States and Alaska, but only about 3 
million were filed. The result was to elimi­
nate many dormant claims which clouded title 
for later claims which are being actively 
developed.
6. Location certificates for post-FLPMA mining claims 
and sites, those located after October 21, 1976, 
must be filed with the BLM state offices within 90 
days from the date of location. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(b).
7. A document is not deemed filed with the BLM until 
stamped by that office as received. 43 C.F.R.
§ 3833.1-2(a).
8. The FLPMA requirements of 1976 to file location 
certificates with the BLM for unpatented claims 
and_ sites is the first time a central registry of 
mining claims on federal lands has been 
established.
9. Assessment work affidavits for claims, but not 
sites, must also be filed with the BLM, using the 
serial numbers assigned for the claim when first filed.
(a) Section 314 _ of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1744, 
required filing of an affidavit of perform­
ance of . assessment work, or a notice of 
intention to hold the claim, with the State 
BLM office before December 31 of each calen­
dar year following the calendar year of 
location of the claim. If not, the claim is 
conclusively deemed abandoned, and many 
claims have been so treated.
(b) Prior to December 31 is on or before December 30.
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(c) The time of location is determined by state 
law.
(d) The Mining Law of 1872 fixes the first assess­
ment period as the twelve months commencing 
at 12:00 o'clock noon on the September 1 
following the date of location. 30 U.S.C.
§ 28. Note that this is not the same as 
assessment work for the calendar year. 
Therefore, as to claims located after noon on 
September 1 and before midnight on December 31, 
the first assessment work is not required 
during the next calendar year. Nevertheless, 
FLPMA requires that proof of assessment work 
or a_ notice of intention to hold the claims 
be filed during that next calendar year since 
it requires such proof be filed prior to year 
end of each year following the calendar year 
of location. A notice of intention to hold 
the claim should be filed in this situation.
10. The BLM manages information about the unpatented 
claims and sites filed with it by use of a computer. 
Serial numbers are assigned to claims as the 
location certificates are filed. Those numbers, 
the names of the claims, the names of the claimants, 
and the quarter sections where the claims are 
located are sent from a computer terminal in the 
state BLM offices to a computer inthe Denver 
Federal Center where the information is stored. 
Thereafter, a computer printout in the foregoing 
four parts is returned weekly to the state offices.
(a) The_ computerized data enables the BLM, as 
well as public users, to determine from the 
printouts where mining claims and tunnel and 
mill sites are.
(b) The data also enables the BLM to identify 
claims, or parts of claims, which the BLM 
rules void if located on withdrawn, appro­
priated, patented or otherwise nonlocatable 
land. The computer also is used to eliminate 
claims which become dormant for lack of 
timely filings.
C. The location of a mining claim consists of distinctly 
marking its boundaries on the ground, as required by 
federal law, and doing the validation work required by
K-1S
state law. These include establishing monuments on the 
corners and sometimes the side centers and end centers, 
posting a location notice at the point of discovery, 
and recording it in with the local county. Some physi­
cal "discovery work" is required such as a shaft, 
drilling or a survey map of the claim.
1. "The location must be distinctly marked on the 
ground so that its boundaries can be readily 
traced. All records of mining claims . . . shall 
contain . . . such a description of the claim or 
claims located by reference to some natural object 
or permanent monument as will identify the claim."
30 U.S.C. § 28. Absent a sufficient description 
in the location certificate to enable identifica­
tion of the location with reasonable certainty, 
the claim is void. U.S. v. Sherman, 288 F. 497 
(8th Cir. 1923).
(a) The state laws govern the details of the 
boundary markers.
(b) Once the claim is marked sufficiently, obliter­
ation of the monuments does not divest the 
claimant of his possessory rights. Eilers v. 
Boatman, 3 Utah 159, 2 P. 66 (1881), af­
firmed, 111 U.S. 356 (1884). Only California, 
by statute, requires maintenance of the claim 
boundary markers. But, to fail to strictly 
maintain the boundary markers subjects the 
claims to overstaking on the assertion it was 
not located properly or was not being maintained.
2. 30 U.S.C. §23 provides no location shall be made 
until the discovery of the vein or lode, but it 
makes no difference whether the physical location 
or the mineral discovery occurs first. E.g., 
Creede & Cripple Creek Mining & Milling Co. v. 
Uinta Tunnel Mining & Transportation Co., 196 U.S. 
337 (1904); Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337 
(1919). The location is unperfected until there 
is a mineral discovery.
3. Whenever the legal acts of location are established 
and discovery of a valuable mineral has occurred, 
a valid location exists, provided rights of third 
parties have not intervened discovery. Only then 
does the locator acquire a vested property right 
as against the U.S. and third parties. Davis v. 
Nelson, 329 F-.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1964).
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4. Prospectors have the right to explore and prospect 
the public domain, 30 U.S.C.- § 22; they have the 
right to stake claims before making a discovery,
30 U.S.C. § 23; but their claim is not perfected 
against the U.S. or third parties until there is 
an actual discovery of a valuable mineral. Davis 
v. Nelson, supra.
5. The right of access to the open public domain to 
explore for locatable minerals is a statutory 
right. 30 U.S.C. § 22 makes such lands "free and 
open to exploration and purchase . . . under 
regulations prescribed by law . . . "  See, e.g. 
Davis v. Nelson, supra.
VIII.The person who is actively and diligently exploring a prospect 
is protected on the land being explored against another 
locator of the same land. These rights prior to discovery 
are known as the doctrine of pedis possessio.
A. Exploration typically proceeds now by aerial surveys 
for anamolies and scientific surveys for traces of 
minerals in air, water, vegetation and soil samples.
B. Favorable results may be followed by deep drilling for 
potential host formations. The underground host forma­
tions are then systematically traced for mineral traces 
and finally narrowed to a mineral deposit.
1. Drilling and other exploration is extremely expensive.
2. Explorers seek to protect their investment by 
claiming all of the target area, thus insuing that 
any commercial deposit within the region will be 
under their claims. This is regional exploration.
C. The doctrine of pedis possessio is set forth in Union
Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337 (1919) and Cole v. 
Ralph, 252 U.S.206 (1920): "In advance of discovery an
explorer in actual occupation and diligently searching 
for mineral is treated as a licensee or tenant at will,
.- and no right can be initiated or acquired through a 
forcible, fraudulent or clandestine intrusion upon his 
possession. But if his occupancy be relaxed, or be 
merely incidental to something other than a diligent 
search for mineral, and another enters peaceably, and 
not fraudently or clandestively, and makes a mineral 
discovery and location, the location so made is valid 
and must be respected accordingly."
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1. Other locators must be excluded by positive action. 
The rival locator can establish rights if he 
enters peaceably. Cole v. Ralph, supra. The 
claimant’s possession must be exclusive. Adams v. 
Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 327 P.2d 308 (1958).
(a) Pedis possession protects against forcible 
entry.
(b) Entry must be denied but the denial need not 
be successful or risk a dangerous confronta­
tion. The first claimant should yield the 
ground, without consenting, and seek his 
legal remedy. In land rushes, the claim 
block should be patrolled to deny all others 
than authorized officials.
2. The claimant must be actively exploring for minerals 
by work reasonably directed toward discovery of a 
valuable mineral to qualify for pedis possessio.
(a) Acts of location such as posting monuments 
and recording notices do not qualify. Adams 
v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 327 P.2d 308 (1958).
(b) Mere performance of assessment work is insuf­
ficient. U.S. v. Stockton Midway Oil Co., 
240 F. 1006 (S.D. Cal. 1917).
(c) Policing the claims, placing signs or fences 
does not qualify. Ranchers Explor. & Develop. 
Co. v. Acaconda Co., 248 F.Supp. 708 (D. Utah 
1965).
(d) Negotiations with others to do the work is 
not pedis possessio work. McLemore v. Express 
Oil Co., 164 Cal. 650, 130 P. 417 (1913).
(e) Exploration plans, without more are insufficient. 
Ranchers Explor., supra.
(f) Construction of drilling pads may qualify.
U.S. v. Grass Creek Oil & Gas Co., 236 F. 481 (8th Cir. 1916).
3. The traditional rule is that pedis possessio 
protects the prospector’s right not only to the 
immediate vicinity of his workings but to the 
entire claim, if he has staked a claim. Gemmel v.
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Swain, 28 Mont. 331, 72 P. 662 (1903). Pedis
possessio rights do not extend beyond the claim or 
claims on which the work is being done. Geomet 
Explor., _ Ltd. v. Lucky Me Uranium Corp., 601 P.2d 
1339 (Ariz. 1979); Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 
327 P .2d 308 (1958).
(a) The federal courts in the Tenth Circuit have
held, however, that pedis possessio rights 
can extend to a group of claims staked on an 
area even though the claimant is only actually 
in physical occupation of some of the claims. 
MacGuire v. Sturgis, 347 F.Supp. 580, (D.
Wyo. 1971); Contintental Oil Co. v. Natrona 
Services, Inc., 588 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 
1978).
(b) The MacGuire v. Sturgis rule for pedis possessio 
holds that a locator is entitled to ". . . the 
exclusive possession [of claims] on a group
or area basis, where, as here the following 
exists or was done for his benefit:
(a) the geology of the area claimed is 
similar and the size of the area claimed 
is reasonable;
(b) the discovery [validation] work referred 
to in the Wyoming Statute is completed;
 (c) an overall work program is m  effect for 
the area claimed;
(d) such work program is being diligently 
pursued, i.e., a significant number of 
exploratory holes have been systemati­
cally drilled; and
(e) the nature of the mineral claimed and 
the cost of development would make it 
economically impracticable to develop 
the mineral if the locator is awarded 
only those claims on which he is actually 
present and currently working."
(c) In Continental Oil v. Natrona Service, the 
Tenth Circuit impliedly approved the MacGuire 
rule by applying it. The senior locator lost 
over half the 2,040 uranium claims to the
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junior because Conoco had not heep drill hole 
logs of the validation drlling, i.e., the 50 
feet of drilling done on each claim at the 
time of staking to comply with the Wyoming 
location law. Without such a drill log, the 
jury did not believe that 50 feet of hole had 
been drilled on each claim. Also, some claim 
monuments were found lying on the ground and 
had never been erected. Conoco lost 1,200 
claims and kept 840 which had not been over­
staked. The trial court awarded 19 of the 
1,200 claims to Conoco, notwithstanding the 
jury verdict, because it had drilled 48 deep 
exploration holes on them.
(d) The Arizona Supreme Court refused to follow
the Tenth Circuit rule of pedis possession on 
an area basis in Geomet Exploration, supra. 
Area pedis possessio is the law in Wyoming, 
however, and probably throughout the other 
Tenth Circuit states, at least in the federal 
courts where there is not state law to the 
contrary. The Tenth Circuit states are 
Wyoming, Utah [may have rejected area pedis 
possessio in Ranchers Explor. & Develop. Co. 
v. Anaconda Co., 248 F.Supp. 708 (D. Utah
1965], Colorado, New Mexico [rejected area 
pedis possessio in Adams v. Benedict], Kansas 
and Oklahoma, both later states being without 
locatable public domain.
(e) The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to 
the Geomet case, so the law of pedis possessio 
may be further defined in 1981. Case No. 
79-1203. The Justice Department urges affir­
mance as well as strict application of the 
Coleman test of present marketability even to 
contests between rival locators.
IX. Discovery of a valuable mineral deposit is the sine qua non 
of a valid mining claim, but the term is not defined in the 
Mining Law of 1872. All the law requires is "discovery of a 
vein or lode within the limits of the claim . . . ." 30 
U.S.C. § 23. And, the law provides for patents to "any land 
claimed and located for valuable deposits." 30 U.S.C. § 29. 
Without a definition in the Act, the courts have had to 
develop a judicial definition of discovery which has grown 
stricter since 1933 and especially since the environmental movement.
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A. The first test of disovery was set out in Castle v. 
Womble, 19 L.D. 455. "When minerals have been found 
and the evidence is of such a character that a person 
of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further 
expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable 
prospect of success, in developing valuable mine, the 
requirements of the statute have been met."
1. The Castle v. Womble rule is know as the prudent 
man test. The test is not whether the individual 
claimant feels justified in expending his labor 
and means, but whether a reasonable person would 
be so justified.
2. The prudent man test was adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313 (1905).
3. The test of mineral discovery has always been 
applied most strictly against the locator when the 
U.S. contests the claim that it has when a junior 
locator overstakes a senior locator’s claim. See 
Chrisman, supra. This is because the rival locators 
are both claiming the same values, whatever they 
may be. Berto v. Wilson, 324 P.2d 843 (Nev. 
1958).
B. The Mining Law of 1872 requires discovery of a valuable 
mineral deposit within the claim. The mineral must be 
exposed in discovery workings, brought to the surface 
in core drilling samples, or in some other reliable 
way, proved to exist.
1. The presence of uranium, or other fissionable 
source mineral, may be proved by radiometric 
readings from probe instruments deep down the 
drill hole, if corroborated by other evidence of 
the mineral. Western Standard Uran. Co. v. Thurston, 
355 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1960).
2. The discovery of a valuable mineral deposit may be 
corroborated by the geology of the general -area,
*■ other known ore bodies or discoveries in the area, 
assay samples, and any other reliable information 
which miners consider as bearing on the possibility 
of developing a paying mine. Rummell v. Bailey, 7 
Utah 2d 137, 320 P.2d 653 (1958).
C. In 1933, the Dept, of Interior formulated another, more 
stringent, test of discovery for nonmetallic minerals
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of widespread occurrence such as sand and gravel. 
Interior succeeded in convincing the Supreme Court in 
1968 to adopt this test, the present marketability 
test, a compliment and refinement of the prudent man 
test. U.S. v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
1. The present marketability test requires the mineral 
claimant to show the deposit can be mined, removed 
and marketed, at present, at a profit after consi­
dering accessibility, development, proximity to 
market, existence of present demand, and other 
factors. Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 836 (D.D.C. 
1959).
2. The present marketability rule requires that all 
costs of mining, removing and marketing the mineral 
be calculated and considered. These costs even 
include a reasonable rate of return on the capital 
invested.
3. The present marketability test, as adopted by the 
Supreme Court, applies to all locatable minerals, 
not just to nonmetallic minerals of widespread 
occurrence. Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d 616 (9th 
Cir. 1968).
4. Despite the Supreme Court’s assertions, the two 
tests of discovery are not complimentary; they are 
diametrically opposed.
(a) . The marketability test requires proof that
the mineral can be extracted, removed and 
sold at a profit, at the present. The prudent 
man test requires proof that there is a 
reasonable prospect of success, in the future, 
of developing an economic mine. Thus, the 
marketability test requires proof of present 
profitability, and the prudent man test 
requires reasonable proof of future profit­ability.
(b) The marketability test delays the time rights 
vest in the locator, leaving the location 
vulnerable to government contest. The require­
ment to prove present marketability during 
the exploration stage, long before the cost 
details can be accumulated, assures the 
government of winning a contest. This defeats 
the statutory right of locators.
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(c) The prudent man rule recognizes the realities 
of mineral development. These include normal 
market cycles_ and other forseeable future 
conditions which the present marketability 
test rules out.
(d) Since Interior convinced the Supreme Court 
the two opposing rules are complimentary, and 
the marketability rule only a refinement of 
the wll-settled prudent man rule, Interior 
and the courts have had to reconcile the two 
and apply one new rule. Since reconciliation 
is logically impossible, the marketability 
rule is given lip service and then largely 
ignored except for nonmetallic minerals of 
widespread occurrence, claims in areas of 
special public interest, and applications for 
patents to claims. The result is unpredica- 
bility, and the rule of men, not of law.
5. The excess reserves rule of Interior which 
would void all locations of valuable minerals 
in excess of the reasonably anticipated 
market need is contrary to the mining law and 
the tests of discovery. Baker v. U.S., 613 
F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1980).
D. The effect of discovery of a valuable mineral
deposit is to perfect the claim.
1. The claim is segregated and removed from the 
unappropriated public domain.
2. The owner is entitled to exclusive possesson 
of the surface, 30 U.S.C. § 26, and, as to 
claims perfected after the Surface Resources 
and Occupancy Act of 1955, subject to surface 
rights of government agents and licensees 
which may not materially interfere with 
mining operations, 30 U.S.C. § 612, and to 
all veins, throughout their depth, which 
appex within the claim. 30 U.S.C. § 26.
3. When the location of a mining claim is per» 
fected, by both acts of location and discov­
ery, it has the effect of a grant by the U.S. 
of present possession. The claim is property 
in the fullest sense of that term; and may be 
sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited
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without infringing any right or title of the 
U.S. Thw owner's right is taxable by the 
state; it is real property subject to judg­
ment liens. The owner is not required to 
purchase the claim by securing a patent from 
the U.S., but so long as he complies with the 
mining laws, and performs assessment work of 
at least $100.00 annually, is entitled to 
hold the claim and develop and market the 
minerals without payment of royalties. 
Wilbur v. U.S. ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 
(1930).
X. Extralateral rights, granted by the Mining Law of 1872, 30 
U.S.C. § 26, give the locator exclusive right to all veins, 
lodes and ledges, throughout their entire depth, if the top 
or apex lies within the surface lines of the claim extended 
downward vertically, and may follow the veins in their 
downward course outside the vertical extension of the side 
lines, but within the vertical extension of the end lines.
A. Extralateral rights mean that, once a claimant establishes 
the apex of a vein within the boundaries of the claim, 
he may follow the vein on its downward course outside 
the claim so long as he stays within the extension of 
the end lines.
1. The locator is presumed to own all ore within the 
boundaries extended downward vertically. St. 
Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co.,
194 U.S. 235 (1904).
2. The one asserting extralateral rights under another's 
claim must have the apex within his claim boundaries. 
Consol. Wyo. Gold Mining Co. v. Champion Mining 
Co., 63 F. 540 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
3. Veins are more likely pursued now by vertical 
shafts and adits dug from the shaft than by fol­
lowing the vein downward. This presents difficult 
problems of proving continuity of the vein in the 
shaft with the vein whose apex is in the claim.
See Silver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
15 Wash. App. 1, 547 P.2d 1240 (1976).
4. Blind appexes are those which do not outcrop on 
the surface, but are somewhere below. The blind 
appex must be _ proved to be within the claim if 
extralateral rights for that claim are to be
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recognized. Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. v. Tarbet,98 U.S. 463 (1879) .
B. Extralateral rights are confined, by the statute, to 
such parts of the vein outside the claim as lie between 
vertical extensions of the end lines. Thus, the loca­
tion of the apex in relation to the end lines fixes the 
sweep of extralateral rights.
1. This means, ideally, that the apex should cross 
both end lines, entitling the locator to exercise 
extralateral rights to the greatest extent allowable.
2. If the apex crosses one end line and passes out a 
side line, the courts locate an imaginary end line 
where the apex go outside the side line. This 
narrows the width of extralateral rights.
3. If the apex crosses one end line and terminates 
within the claim, an imaginary end line is fixed 
where the vein terminates. This also limits 
extralateral rights.
-4. If the apex crosses both side lines, the end lines 
become the side lines, and vice versa, for fixing 
extralateral rights.
5. 30 U.S.C. § 23 requires that claims be located 
with the side lines parallel to the course of the
- vein. "A mining claim . . . may equal, but shall
not exceed, 1500 feet in length along the vein or 
lode. . . . "  "No claim shall extend more than 300 
feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the 
surface . . . ." Therefore, the strike of the 
vein, its course along the surface, must be deter­
mined to ascertain the orientation of the long 
axis of the claim with the strike. Argentine 
Mining Co. v. Terrible Mining Co., 122 U.S. 478 
(1887). This is the basis for changing the orien- 
f tation of the claim, as previously described, in
determining extralateral rights and in fixing the 
claim boundaries for patent, also. End lines may 
only be brought parallel or adjusted if done 
within a reasonable time and without including new 
ground. Doe v. Sanger, 83 Cal. 203, 23 P. 365 
(1890).
6. Floating claims are not allowed; that is, end 
lines may not be moved from time to time to take
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advantage of subterranean developments. Otherwise 
uncertainty would result. Iron Silver Mining Co. 
v. Elgin Mining Co., 118 U.S. 196 (1886).
C. The purposes of recognizing extralateral rights are to
encourage complete mining of a deposit by allocating
ownership of the entire deposit.
1. Confining extralateral rights to end line exten­
sions is intended to fairly allocate the deposits 
among locators according to the surface of the 
claims.
2. If the end lines are not parallel, the sweep of 
extralateral rights could be ever-widening. Thus, 
30 U.S.C. § 23 requires parallel end lines. End 
lines will be considered parallel if substantially 
so. Grant v. Pilgrim, 95 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 
1938).
3. If the vein splits and dips, in both directions, 
the locator has the right to follow both.
4. Extralateral rights do not extend into all lands.
(a) Extralateral rights extend into mining lands, 
whether patented or unpatented, and whether 
the other location is junior or senior.
(b) Extralateral rights do not extend into pre­
viously _ patented agricultural lands because a 
conclusive presumption arises, upon patent­
ing, that these lands were nonmineral, else 
the patent would not have issued.
(c) Extralateral rights vest when a claim is 
perfected by location and discovery; there­
fore those vested extralateral rights do 
extend into subsequently patented agricul­tural lands.
5. Extralateral rights do not attach to all mining 
claims, only those with a vein or lode which 
apexes within the limits of the claim.
(a) Extralateral rights do not attach to placer 
claims; they are not based on veins or lodes.
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6.
(b) Extralateral rights do not attach to dissemi­
nated ore bodies which are bedded and nearly 
horizontal because they have no apex.
If veins intersect underground, the prior location 
takes the mineral in the intersection, but the 
junior location is entitled to a right of way 
through the intersection.
7. If veins fork or split, leading in two directions, 
the senior locator has the right to both.
XI. Assessment work is required by the Mining Law in order for 
the locator to demonstrate that he was claiming possession 
in good faith, for mining purposes, and to give notice to 
rival locators of his claim. Chambers v. Harrington, 111 
U.S. 350 (1884); Udall v. The Oil Shale Corp., 406 F.2d 759 
(1969), reversed on other grounds, 400 U.S. 48 (1970).
A. "On each claim located after the 10th day of May, 1972, 
and until a patent has been issued therefor, not less 
than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or improve­
ments made during each year." 30 U.S.C. § 28. The
' assessment year is the annual period commencing on 
12:00 o'clock noon on the 1st of September succeeding 
the date of location.
B. If the work is not performed as and when required, the 
ground is then open to location by another claimant as
' if no prior claim had been staked. However, if the 
intial claimant or successors resumes assessment work, 
no relocation may be made. 30 U.S.C. § 28; Belk v. 
Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 (1881).
C. .Until Hickel v. The Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970)
(the TOSCO case), only a rival locator could challenge 
a claim by relocating it for failure of assessment 
work. The TOSCO decision held that the validity of an 
unpatented claim depends on substantial compliance with 
' the assessment work requirement. The TOSCO decision of 
1970 recognized, for the first time, the right of the 
government to contest claims for failure to do assess­
ment work as and when required, but it may not apply to 
any mining claims except pre-1920 oil shale claims.
1. The TOSCO case is a minority opinion, difficult to 
reconcile internally, and opposed to the Interior 
rule in effect up to its adoption that Interior 
had no authority to assert failure of assessment 
work as grounds for invalidating a claim.
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2. The TOSCO case was based on special facts, namely 
oil shale claims located on ground which had been 
withdrawn from location and not subject to reloca­
tion by other private parties.
3. Even though Interior amended its regs. to assert 
that its power to challenge claims applied to all 
minerals, it is doubtful that the U.S. can attack 
claims to other minerals on this basis, at least 
where the ground had been open at all times to 
mineral entry and location.
4. The resolution to this question will determine 
whether the claimant should resume labor (to 
revive a dormant location which Interior may claim 
was void) or relocate (to initiate a new right).
5. The Supreme Court held in 1980 that oil shale 
claims were not subject to the usual discovery 
test for a valuable mineral deposit requiring 
present marketability because Congress had im­
plicitly ratified the application of the prudent 
man test to oil shale in hearings of 1918, 1930-31, 
and 1956, clearly recognizing oil shale as a 
valuable mineral subject to location and patent. 
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 48 L.W. 4603 (June 3, 
1980).
D. The Mining Law of 1872 contemplates that assessment
work be performed after discovery of a valuable mineral
deposit and location of a claim. 30 U.S.C. § 28.
1. "Discovery is the source of title to a mining 
claim, and until a discovery of mineral is made 
withinthe claim, the location is not perfected. 
Accordingly, until a discovery is made, the ques­
tion of the performance of assessment work is 
immaterial." 2 Am. Law of Mining § 7.7.
2. Before discovery, locators do assessment work to 
comply with state law, and since 1976, with FLPMA, 
requiring the filing of assessment affidavits 
after location of a claim and to ward off rival locators.
(a) Before discovery, the locator has the pre­
discovery rights of pedis possessio. Pedis 
possessio requires actual occupation of the 
claim in a diligent search for mineral.
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(b) After discovery, the location is perfected 
and actual occupation is no longer required. 
Rather, rights are maintained by the construc­
tion possession given by the recorded loca­
tion certificates and by the performance of 
annual assessment work.
Mere performance of assessment work before discovery 
does not necessarily constitute diligent exploration 
for pedis possessio purposes. 1 Am. Law of Mining § 4.8.
4. Since assessment work can only be done after a 
discovery, it must be done to develop the deposit.
E. The definition of assessment work is that it must
directly tend to develop the deposit and facilitate the 
extraction of minerals. Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 
636 (1882); Great Eastern Mines, Inc. v. Metals Corp. 
of America, 86 N.M. 717, 537 P.2d 112 (1974). It is 
not the amount of the expenditure which counts,'but the 
reasonable value of the labor or improvements toward 
development of the claim which is critical. Smelting 
Co. v. Kemp.
1. Exploration work to make a discovery does not 
qualify as assessment work.
2. Exploration work after discovery of a valuable 
deposit to further define the limits of the de­
posit and other characteristics such as its aver­
age grade would qualify as assessment work. 
Indeed, development drilling is usually essential 
to mine planning and development.
3. Development work is that which provides access to 
the mineral deposit for extraction of ore. Devel­
opment work therefore qualifies as assessment 
work.
i
4. Of course, actual mining operations qualify as 
assessment work.
5. Construction of improvements such as buildings, 
shafts, the addition of machinery, and other 
structures for extraction of mineral qualify as 
assessment work.
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6. Building a mill does not always count as_ assess­
ment work because a mill does not facilitate 
extraction of ore from the ground.
7. Construction of ore houses qualifies as assessment 
work but not residential cabins unless mining 
operations were actually conducted and housing on 
site was necessary to those operations.
8. Construction of roads and bridges can be assess­
ment work if it facilitates extraction of the 
mineral.
9. No list of work or improvements can be drawn which 
always qualifies as assessment work. What quali­
fies depends on the particular discovery.
F. By a 1958 amendment to the Mining Law, assessment labor 
was defined to include geological, geochemical, and 
geophysical surveys if conducted by a qualified expert 
and verified by a detailed report filed of record. 30 
U.S.C. § 28-1.
1. These scientific surveys are the typical reconnais­
sance method used in regional exploration to find 
a deposit, but not to develop a known deposit.
2. Scientific surveys are rarely filed as evidence of 
assessment work, especially since the law requires 
disclosure of the basic findings at specific 
points.
G. A fundamental requirement of assessment work is that it 
must be performed in good faith for the proper purpose. 
E.g., Sampson v. Page, 129 Cal. App. 2d 356, 276 P.2d 
871 (1954).
H. Assessment work need not occur on the claims, or even 
on contiguous claims, despite the misunderstandings 
flowing from a loose dictum in Chambers v. Harrington, 
111 U.S. 350 (1884), but can occur "at a distance from 
the claim itself." Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636 (1881).
1. In Chambers, the Supreme Court said assessment 
work performed off one claim can only qualify as 
work for that claim if it occurs on a contiguous 
claim. But Chambers involved a shaft which can 
only benefit specific claims if it is extended to them by drifts or tunnels.
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2. Despite Chambers, courts do allow assessment work 
to qualify even if performed outside contiguous 
claims, at least if it tends to develop the claim 
and facilitate extraction of minerals. Thus, 
road, ditches to divert water to the site, regional 
drilling and other work in geologic basis have 
been accepted. See 2 Am. Law of Mining, Ch. III.
(a) The requirement of contiguity would be illogical.
(b) The important test is benefit; whether the 
work benefits the claims.
3. The Mining Law, 30 U.S.C. § 28, specifically 
allows the work done on any one claim to be appor­
tioned among a group to hold all of them, if the 
claims are held in common.
(a) There must be a community of interest in the 
claims giving some common right in the assess­
ment work. The owner whose possessory right 
depends on work done elsewhere must have a 
legal relationship to the work done if it is 
to inure to the benefit of his claims. New 
Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co.,
102 Utah 131, 128 P.2d 269 (1942), cert,
denied, 319 U.S. 753 (1943).
(b) If the work has a direct tendency to develop 
two sets of claims owned by different parties, 
the lessee of both sets of claims may apply 
the work to both sets, even without the 
consent of the owner where the work was done.
New Mercur.
"Upon the failure of any one of several co-owners to 
contribute his proportion of the expenditures required 
[for assessment work], the co-owners who have performed 
the labor or made the improvements may, at the expira­
tion of the year, give such delinquent co-owner personal 
notice in writing or notice by publication in the 
newspaper published nearest the claim, for at least one 
week for ninety days, and if at the expiration . . . such 
delinquent should fail or refuse to contribute his 
proportion . . ., his interest . . . shall become the 
property of his co-owners. . . ." 30 U.S.C. § 28.
1. This 1872 forfeiture provision does not comport 
with current concepts of due process notice holding
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service by publication isn't adequate notice when 
the actual whereabouts of the party are known.
2. It may be that the 1872 procedure is adequate 
considering that Congress has the sole power over 
the public lands according to such rules and regs. 
as it deems necessary. Property clause.
3. To be safe, however, it is advisable to obtain 
personal service in forfeiture proceedings.
XII. Even a perfected mining location, if unpatented, does not 
entitle the claimant to unfettered and exclusive use of the 
surface.
A. As to all claims not located or not perfected by a 
discovery as of July 23, 1955, when the Surface Re­
sources Act was adopted, the U.S. retains the right to 
manage and dispose of the vegetative resources, to 
manage other surface resources, and to use the surface, 
for itself, its permittees and licensees, for access to 
adjacent land. Surface Resources Act of 1955, 30
U.S.C. § 612.
1. The use of the mining claim surface may not en­
danger or materially interfere with mineral 
operations.
2. If the locator requires more timber than that left 
by the U.S., he is entitled to free timber from 
the U.S.
3. Except to the extent required to clear for mineral 
operations and the construction of mining struc­
tures, the locator may not cut timber or other 
vegetative resources.
4. Government permittees and licensees may go on
unpatented mining claims to pursue that right or 
to gain access to other federal land for that 
purpose so long as there is no interference with 
ongoing mining _ operations. Examples, not exclus­
ive, are hunting, fishing, camping. U.S. v. 
Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 415 F.Supp. 1373 (E.D.
Cal. 1976), affirmed, 611 F.2d_ 1277 (9th Cir.
1980) (defining government permittees and licen­
sees as general members of the public who need not 
hold a written permit except as to an activity 
which is specifically regulated).
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5. Guards may be employed to protect the claim, if 
they give proper persons access, but unmanned 
fences, barricades and no-trespass signs are not 
proper. U.S. v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, 415 F. Supp. 
1373. The _locators of active mining operations 
have the right to forbid trespass in their build­
ings, mine workings and mills.
B. The regulations for surface management of mining claims 
which were proposed by the Dept, of the Interior on 
March 3, 1980, 45 FR 13956, would create a substantial 
new impediment to mineral operation on the public 
domain.
1. Interior says that the Mining Law of 1972, 30 
U.S.C. § 22, provides that exploration, location 
and purchase of valuable mineral deposits on 
public lands shall be "under regulations pres­
cribed by law." 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-3(a) (proposed 
Mar. 3, 1980 at 45 Fed. Reg. 13956-13979).
(a) 30 U.S.C. § 22, the Mining Law of 1872, does 
not give the Secretary authority to make law 
concerning appropriation of mineral deposits. 
That power is reserved to Congress under the 
Article 4 property clause. Const., Art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 2.
(b) Neither does 30 U.S.C. § 22 grant authority 
to the Secretary to make regulations for 
appropriation of mineral deposits. Instead, 
the only authorization in the Mining Law of 
1872 to promulgate such regulations is that 
in 30 U.S.C. § 38 which grants the power to 
"the miners of each mining district." Butte 
City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905) 
(holding the authority to prescribe the 
regulations is granted to the miners in the 
mining districts, but may also be excercised 
by the states, as successors); See D. Sherwood, 
Mining-Claim Recordation and Prospecting 
under FLPMA, 23 Rocky Mtn. Mineral L. Inst.
1, 9-10 (1977).
(c) True, FLPMA requires the Secretary of the 
Interior to take any action necessary to 
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of 
the public lands, 43 U.S.C. § 1201; but the 
same section provides that neither this
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section nor any other section of FLPMA "shall 
in any way amend the Mining Law of 1872 or 
impair the rights of any locators or claims 
under that Act, including but not limited to, 
rights of ingress and egress," except as 
FLPMA requires federal recordation of mining 
claims, provides for BLM wilderness study, or 
specifically allows regulation of all mining 
claims on public lands within the California 
Desert Conservation Area.
(d) The most reasonable interpretation is that 
FLPMA does not authorize the proposed regs. 
insofar as they would "impair the rights of 
any locators or claims under [the 1872 Mining 
Law], including, but not limited to, rights 
of ingress and egress." It will remain for 
the courts to determine of the BLM surface 
management regs. can be sustained.
(e) As opposed to BLM-managed lands, there is 
statutory authority for the Forest Service to 
control mining operations in national forests. 
16 U.S.C. § 478 provides mineral development 
"must comply with the rules and regulations 
covering such national forests," but the 
Mining Law of 1872 has not been amended so 
much by this part of the Organic Act of 1897 
as to allow the Forest Service surface man­
agement regs. to bar mining operations.
(f) The Surface Resources Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C.
§ 612, states that "rights to any mining 
claim . . . shall be subject . . .  to the 
right of the United States to manage . . . 
the surface resources." This authority to 
protect and sell vegetation and other re­
sources should not be deemed a general 
authority to_ control mining operations, and 
it is not cited as authority by the Forest 
Service for its regs. or by the BLM for its 
proposed regs. It does authorize the Forest 
Service to bar use of a backhoe, bulldozer, 
and blasting, even on a valid, perfected 
mining claim, as unreasonable destruction of 
national forest lands. Richardson v. Andrus, 
599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 
100 S. Ct. 663 (1980) .
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(g) The Forest Service has required miners to 
obtain approval of a plan of operations if 
the proposed mining activity may affect 
surface resources on land managed by the 
Forest Service. 36 CFR §§ 252.1-252.15.
(h) The^ proposed BLM regs. state "it is the 
policy of the regulation [sic] to encourage 
-the development of Federal mineral resources. 
Under the 1872 Mining Law (30 U.S.C. 23 et 
seq.), a person has a statutory right, not a 
mere privilege, consistent with Departmental 
regulations, to go upon the open (unappro­
priated and unreserved) public lands for the 
purpose of mineral prospecting, exploration, 
development and extracting." 43 C.F.R.
§ 3809.0-6. It is hypocritical to say the 
regs. encourage mining.
2. The proposed BLM regs. would apply to all locat- 
able public lands, including stockraising mineral 
reservations, but not to units within the National 
Parks or Forests. The Forest Service has its own 
regs. for these areas.
3. The main thrust of the proposed BLM regs., 43
C.F.R. § 3809.1-1, is to require a plan of opera­
tions be submitted to the BLM for approval prior 
to any mining operations involving:
(a) Construction or improving ; roads, bridges, 
landing areas;
(b) Destroying trees of 2" or more at the base;
(c) Using tracked or mechanized earth moving 
equipment;
(d) Using motor vehicles off "open use areas and 
trails";
(e) Placing mobile or fixed structures for over 
30 days;
(f) Using explosives;
(g) Operations which "may cause changes in a 
water course."
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4. The plan of operations must include, 43 C.F.R.
§ 3809.1-3:
(a) The identity of the operator;
(b) A topo map or sketch of access roads and 
surface areas to be disturbed;
(c) The operation, means of performance, and 
structures and facilities. The operator may 
submit porposed reclamation measures;
(d) The serial number of any claims;
(e) For mining operation in wilderness areas, a 
statement of the manner and degree of opera­
tions before FLPMA was adopted on Oct. 21, 
1976. Those cannot be exceeded because FLPMA 
precludes impairing potential BLM wilderness 
areas for inclusion in the Wilderness System.
5. The BLM district office has 30 days to approve or 
disapprove the plan or require changes, or may 
state 60 more days will be needed for review.
6. Even after a plan is approved, the BLM may require 
modifications.
7. The operator must file a bond in an amount deter­
mined by the BLM as assurance of reclamation.
8. The BLM may seek a court order to enjoin violations. 
43 C.F.R. § 3809.3-2.
9. The regs. recognize that the operator is entitled 
to access to his mining operations under the 
mining laws, but authorizes the BLM to locate the 
access route, maintenance, and vehicles. 32 
C.F.R. § 3809.3-3.
10. The general public does not have a right to appeal 
a BLM decision.
11. The regs. contemplate eventual adoption of federal- 
state programs for adoption.
XIII.There is no legal requirement that mining claims or sites be 
patented. If they were validly located and the possessory 
right maintained according to the federal and state laws and
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regulations, the claims remain valid without a patent.
Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220(1904).
A. The mining claimant only has a possessory title, one 
dependant upon his maintaining possession and subject 
to the paramount title of the U.S.
B. Nevertheless, the mineral deposits in unpatented mining 
claims may be entirely removed without obtaining a 
patent or payment to the U.S.
C. The Dept, of the Interior is now the principal adver­
sary of unpatented claim holders.
1. The BLM may challenge claims for lack of discovery, 
failure of assessment work, or nonavailability of 
the land for location, or failure to file required 
notices.
2. The new BLM surface regs. are another means for 
the BLM to impede mining.
D. ' Rival locators may overstake unpatented claims.
E. A patent conveys the fee simple title within the area 
patented and to the full extent of all veins or lodes 
which apex within the claim.
F. The inherent insecurity of title and tenure which are 
posed to mining claimants virtually compels a patent 
application for any sizeable mining operation.
1. Mining operations costs hundreds of millions for 
environmental studies and permits, water rights, 
mills, mining, hauling, treating, smelting, shipp­
ing and reclamation.
2. Mining companies and lenders must have security of 
title.
G. The Mining Law of 1872 extends the right to patent, 
that is, the right to purchase fee simple title from 
the U.S.
1. At least $500 worth of development work and a 
valuable mineral deposit are required on each 
claim.
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2. The statute is still the same as in 1972, but the 
burden of proving entitlement to a patent has 
increased substantially.
H. The applicant for patent bears the burden of proving 
entitlement to a patent. Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 
836 (D.D.Cir. 1959).
I. There are three major steps to the patent process.
The mineral survey marks the legal boundaries of 
the claim or site.
The patent application is then filed and adjudicated 
by the BLM to establish the applicant's eligibility, 
available of the land, and the publication of 
public notice to allow adverse claims by other 
locators.
If a favorable office adjudication results, the 
most critical stage ensues, namely the mineral 
examination by a U.S. mineral examiner.
If the mineral exam is favorable, the claims are 
clearlisted for patent, and the patent issues in 
due course.
(a) If a valuable mineral discovery is not proved, 
the U.S. automatically invalidates the loca­
tion rather than just rejecting the patent. 
U.S. v. Carlile, 67 I.D. 417 (1960).
(b) The locator can relocate and continue devel­
opment work, at least if the land hasn't been 
withdrawn by the U.S. or located by a rival 
locator in the interim.
J. An environmental impact statement is not required by
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, § 4332(C), prior to issuance of a 
mineral patent. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires 
federal agencies to prepare an EIS for "major federal 
actions which significantly affect the quality of the , human environment."
1. The EIS_ is intended to aid the federal agency in 






2. The issuance of a mineral patent is a ministerial 
act which does not require the exercise of discre­
tion by Interior. Wilbur v. U.S. ex rel. Krushnic, 
28 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1929); Cameron v. U.S., 252 
U.S. 450, 454 (1920); Roberts v. U.S., 176 U.S. 
221, 231 (1920); U.S. v. Kosanke Sand Corp., 12 
IBLA 282, 290-91 (1973); U.S. v. O ’Leary, 63 ID 
341 (1956).
3. Upon satisfying the requirements of the Mining 
Law, the claimant has an absolute right to a 
patent from the U.S., and the actions by Interior 
to process the patent application are not discre­
tionary; issuance of a patent can be compelled by 
court order. The patent can contain no conditions 
not authorized by law. Furthermore, the claimant 
need not apply for patent to preserve his property 
right in the claim but may extract all the minerals 
without ever acquiring full legal title. The 
patent, if issued, conveys fee simple title to the 
land, but does nothing to enlarge or diminish the 
claimant's right to its locatable minerals. South 
, Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(quoting the lower court with approval).
(a) The Eight Circuit concluded it is "at least 
doubtful" that mineral patent issuances are 
actions subject to NEPA. Also, the Eight 
Circuit doubted that an EIS is compatible 
with the Secretary's duties under the Mining 
Law. South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 
(8th Cir. 1980) (petition for cert, pending). 
Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.D.C. 1979).
(b) The Eight Circuit held that the issuance of a 
mineral patent is not a major federal action 
because it does not enable the patentee to 
begin mining operations. Instead, opening a 
mine on Forest Service lands will probably 
require discretionary actions in the future, 
e.g., Forest Service permits for roads, water 
pipelines and railroad rights of way. 43 
U.S.C. § 1761(a)(1) and (a)(6). If these, or 
the plan of operations required by the Forest 
Service regs., 36 C.F.R. Part 252, are major 
federal actions, an EIS may be required then. 
South Dakota v. Andrus.
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(c) The same can be said of other public lands, 
namely, if any one of the various permits 
required for mineral operations is a major 
federal action, an EIS may be first required.
XIV. The hostility of government regulatory officials, encouraged 
by private conservation groups, has seriously hampered the 
mining industry and has caused a serious shortage of minerals.
A. True, the mining laws need improvement to better promote
mineral exploration.
1. The Mining Law of 1872 was enacted over a century 
ago for other conditions.
2. Secure exploration rights to regional areas cannot 
be obtained. Pedis possessio affords only weak 
protection against rival locators and none against 
the withdrawal by the U.S.
3. The acreage limits of roughly 20 acres per claim 
are insufficient for modern mining projects and 
techniques. Economic mining units which cover the 
deposit, however shaped, are needed.
4. Tunnel sites are obsolete but the same type of 
protection is not afforded to the replacement, 
i.e., deep drill holes.
5. Extralateral rights are obsolete since dips are 
rarely followed at length down dip. Instead, 
protection of access by shafts and adits is needed.
6. The distinction between lodes and placer deposits 
and mill sites is confused and inapplicable to 
moder mining, but it remains critical to the 
validity of a claim or site.
7. Mill sites do not provide adequate work space or 
tailings space for modern mining methods.
8. Connecting access between discontinuous claims via 
adits is not possible under the present law.
9. The test of discovery of a valuable mineral deposit 
can be applied arbitrarily and unreasonably, without certainty.
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10. Governmental withdrawals and Forest Service and 
BLM wilderness studies, have removed the great 
bulk of public lands from mineral access and 
location.
11. Government administration is bogged down in files 
over 100 years old without knowing in many cases 
its own ownership, mineral status, withdrawal 
areas, and so on. The multitude of studies and 
regs. for new programs required by FLPMA of 1976 
are only slowly developing.
12. Tenure and security of title on the public lands 
are highly uncertain, for these and other reasons.
B. Since the first leasing law for leasing of lead mines 
from 1807 to 1846, and since the debates from 1900 to 
1920 over adoption of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 
leasing has been touted as the only cure. Leasing is 
supposed to give miners exploration areas and tenure, 
and to protect the public by requiring royalties, 
diligent exploration, diligent development and mining, 
with less environmental damage and more reclamation.
1. Nevertheless, leasing can be said to be a demon­
strated failure under the Mineral Leasing Act of 
1920. H.B. Mock, Mining Law. Trends, 54 U. Denver 
L. Rev. 567, 577 (1977).
i (a) The Secretary of the Interior has always 
declined to lease many lands and many types 
of minerals.
(b) The leasing act minerals are in shorter 
supply than locatable minerals.
2. Administrative leasing policies, where the govern­
ment leases, have failed to lease economic mining 
units which has halted production. The western 
coal industry is an example of an industry stymied 
by government agency even though the current and 
last two presidents and a multitude of public 
institutions consistently announce great increases 
in coal production are necessary in the public 
interest.
3. Because of the failure of the leasing system, the 
GAO in 1979 recommended the retention of the 
location-patent system, albeit with changes to
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improve the tenure of the miner and reasonable 
environmental protection. GAO, "Mining Law Reform 
and Balanced Resource Management," Feb. 27, 1979.
C. The right of self-initiation of the miner under the 
location system to seek and extract minerals where they 
occur on the public lands is essential to survival of 
the nation as a leading world power.
1. The right of access and exploration may properly 
be made subject to environmental protection and 
careful reclamation. The mining industry can and 
will protect the land.
2. Congress has not abandoned the location system, 
for the foregoing reasons, for 108 years. Despite 
the constant cries that it do so, Congress will 
not soon make the nation more dependent for min­
erals upon hostile government agencies.
D. A resolution of the conflicts over the dual threats of 
major environmental and social harm, on the one hand, 
and crippling mineral shortgages, on the other, is 
imperative for the national well being.
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